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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 31/07/2006 Accident number: 428 
Accident time: 10:35 Accident Date: 01/08/2002 
Where it occurred: M4176 MF, Phum O 
Lvie, Khum Boeung 
Being, Malai District, 
BMC, BANTEAY 
MEANCHAY 
Country: Cambodia 
Primary cause: Victim inattention (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment (?)
Class: Vegetation removal 
accident 
Date of main report: 08/08/2002 
ID original source: AS Name of source: [Name removed] 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: soft 
Date record created: 31/07/2006 Date  last modified: 31/07/2006 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR 135965 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
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Accident report 
The internal accident report was made available during 2005. It is reproduced below, edited 
for anonymity. 
INVESTIGATION REPORT 
INTO MINE ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON 01 AUGUST 2002 AT M4176 MINEFIELD, 
BANTEAY MEANCHAY. 
  
REPORT PREPARED BY: DEPUTY DIRECTOR  PLANNING AND OPERATIONS 
CONTENTS 
 
1. Order for assembly of Investigation. 
2. Report by the Investigation Team.     
3. Statements By:  
a. First Witness, Section Commander DU1 
b. Second Witness, deminer DU1 
c. Third Witness, [The Victim], [Demining group] deminer DU1 
5. Report and attachments by [Demining group] Manager     
ORDER FOR ASSEMBLY OF FORMAL INVESTIGATION 
Orders by:  Deputy Director General, [Demining Group] 
 
A formal investigation is to be conducted as soon as possible for the purpose of collecting and 
recording evidence into the Mine Accident that occurred on 01 August 2002 in the M4176 
Minefield, BMC, in which one deminer was injured. 
The investigation team is to prepare a report and provide comment based on its findings. The 
Team leader is to present the findings of the investigation to the [Demining group] executive 
council within five days of the conduct of the investigation. 
Team Leader, Deputy Director Planning and Operations 
The team leader may summons any witnesses to attend who are employees of [Demining 
group]. 
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
Background 
1.  What is the history of the minefield? 
2.  When, where and at what time did the accident occur? 
3.  Who were the persons involved? 
4.  What were the circumstances leading up to the accident? 
5.  Describe the nature of the accident in detail. 
6.  When did clearance operations commence in the minefield? 
7.  Have clearance operations concluded? 
8.  Has the minefield been formally handed over to the appropriate authority? 
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Analysis 
1.  Did the accident occur in the [Demining group] minefield? 
2.  What caused the injuries? 
3.  What was the nature and extent of the injuries to the casualties? 
4.  What action was taken immediately after the accident was reported to [Demining 
group]? 
5.  What measures could have taken place to prevent the accident? 
6.  Were any [Demining group] SOP or written orders breached? 
7.  Is there any weakness in our current method of the control and monitor? 
8.  Were there any problems specific to this minefield or area that made demining 
difficult? 
9.  Are there any problems with our current mine detectors and their ability to detect 
mines or UXO buried up to 10 centimetres deep? 
 
Post Accident 
1.  Were all accident notifications completed according to internal order/SOP? 
2.  How can we prevent this from happening again in the future? 
3.  What if anything has been done to assist the accident victims? 
4.  Has the Minefield been re checked? 
5.  What actions has the DU taken to try and prevent a re occurrence of the same 
nature? 
 
Signed at:  Phnom Penh, 01  August 2002, Deputy Director General Demining Group 
 
FORMAL INVESTIGATION 
SUMMARY FINDINGS 
General 
1.  The formal investigation into the accident was conducted over the period 01 – 02 
August 2002. In addition to visiting the accident scene, two witnesses were interviewed and 
their evidence recorded. The following is a record of the investigation as well as the summary 
findings and recommendations. 
Terms of Reference 
2. The following answers are provided to questions directed by the Deputy Director 
General. 
a.  Background 
Q) What is the history of the minefield?     
A) The minefield was laid in the 1980s by the Khmer Rouge, VN, and Government Forces for 
defending  along Khmer-Thai border. It was a hot base line battlefield in the former KR 
stronghold. Demining operations commenced on 08 July 2002 and still continue. About 96 AP 
Mines and at least 14 UXO  have been found so far. Most types of mines found include the 
PMN. Patterns suggest that the mines were laid defensively. The purpose of clearing this 
area is for agriculture. Before [Demining group] arrived, a bulldozer had been used to clear up 
the field. It left piles of soil along the sides of the field with mines located within them.  
Q)  When, where and at what time did the accident occur? 
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A) The accident happened at approximately 10:35 hrs on 01 August 2002 at GR 135965, in 
Minefield M4176 at Phum O Lvie, Khum Boeung Being, Malai District, BMC. 
 
The picture shows the accident site with the Victim’s sunhat beside the crater. 
Q) Who were the persons involved?     
A) Mobile Platoon 103 of DU1 and three persons were directly involved. Mr. [The Victim] Mr 
[Deminer 1],  Mr. [Section Commander] mobile platoon 103. 
Q) What were the circumstances leading up to the accident? 
A) During conducting Vegetation Removal Drills at minefield M4176, to pull a branch of 
deadwood which its end buried in a mound of excavated soil from the uncleared area at the 
head of lane and it was activated and detonated to a buried mine underneath.  
Q) Describe the nature of the accident in detail. 
A) Referring to demining sequence, deminer no. 1 conducted vegetation removal drill 
(skipped tripwire drill due to none of tripwire); upon completion of the vegetation removal drill, 
deminer no. 2 [ the victim] conducted detector drill. These drills had been repeated two to 
three times already to the time of accident occurred. Mr. [name excised], the victim's peer, 
told that he found deminer no. 1 removed the cut salvages once then the second time and 
then he heard an explosion and found [the victim] falling backward into the cleared area. Then 
he called section commander for help, section commander called to mobile platoon 
commander and platoon commander called medic but he was absent then Mobile Platoon 
Commander 101 who treated and stabilized the victim  before evacuating him to Battambang 
Emergency Hospital. The  victim was evacuated at around 11:00 hrs from M4176 and arrived  
Battambang Emergency Hospital around 14:20 hrs. 
Q) When did clearance operations commence in the minefield? 
A) Clearance operations commenced on 08 July 2002. 
Q) Have clearance operations concluded?    
A) No. The area of the accident was in a process of being cleared.  
Q) Has the minefield been handed over to the appropriate authority?  
A) No, it has not been fully cleared as yet. 
b.  Analysis 
Q) Did the accident occur in [Demining group] Minefield? 
A) Yes. The accident occurred in a perimeter MF boundary. 
Q) What caused the injuries?      
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A) Based on the physical evidence, a Type PMN Anti Personnel Mine.  
Q) What was the nature and extent of injuries to casualties? 
A) Only one person, the victim, was injured. He  suffered a blast injury to the face and gravely 
hurt to left eye, which might be lost sight or blind.  
Q) What action was taken immediately after the accident was reported to [Demining group]? 
 A) After being informed shortly after the accident, Mobile Platoon Commander 
dispatched an ambulance and medic to treat, stabilize the victim and then transported to the 
Emergency Hospital in Battambang. The DU Manager later inspected the accident scene and 
conducted a preliminary scene examination to establish the facts. 
Q) What measures could have taken place to prevent the accident? 
A) It shall be adhered strictly to SOP and conduct demining drill accordingly. 
Q) Were any [Demining group] SOP or written orders breached? 
A) Yes. 
Q) Are there any problems with our current Mine detectors and their ability to detect Mines or 
UXO buried up to 10 cm deep? 
A) No. The Platoon Commander who cleared the area in the vicinity of the accident was 
confident in the mine detectors ability to locate all types of mines up to a depth of 10 cm. In 
saying this though, there is a lot of discussion on the age, battery usage and workloads  
placed on the detectors. But for this case it happened at the vegetation removal drill. 
Q) Were there any problems specific to this minefield or area that made demining difficult? 
A) Yes. A bulldozer was used to clear a field exploding mines as it progressed as well as 
making a range of mounds at the end of the field which buried deadwood and an unknown 
quantity of mines. [Demining group] deminers wherever  possible, level by level, cleared and 
continue to clear as many of these mounds as possible. There were mounds of earth at the 
accident site. 
Q) Is there any weakness in our current method of quality control? 
A) In this accident, this question is not applicable. The accident caused by the negligence or 
not adhered to SOP, he thought that that rotten branch of deadwood could be pulled without 
disturbing to any buried mines, then he pulled it of which end buried in a mound, where there 
have been incorrectly placed mines. 
c.  Post Accident 
Q) Were all accident notifications completed according to internal orders/SOP? 
A) In the process. 
Q) How can we prevent this from happening again in the future? 
A) All deminers, Section Commanders are to be refresher training on demining drills, basically 
on vegetation removal drill, Mine detector drill and Prodder and Excavation drill. 
Q) What if anything has been done to assist the accident victims? 
A) Not as yet. It shall be decided by Compensation Committee adhered to [Demining group] 
Policy.  
Q) Has the area been re checked or cleared?    
A) No. The area is yet to be cleared. It is hoped that BC will be deployed to complete the 
clearance of these mound areas. 
Q) What action has the DU taken to prevent a re-occurrence of the same nature? 
A) Reinforcing strictly control and directly coach on the safety manner of demining operations 
in the hazardous area. 
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Conclusion 
3.  The accident occurred in a [Demining group] Minefield, M4176 caused by pulling a 
branch of deadwood from the head of clearance lane, of which it activated and detonated to a 
buried mine underneath the mound of soil. It is breached SOP, adherence to [Demining 
group] SOP – Vegetation Removal drill,...[ "All vegetation must be cut from the top down and 
cut into manageable sizes so that pieces not fall into the uncleared area..." ... "Vegetation is 
not to be pulled or forced from uncleared area"...] etc. 
4.  Based on physical evidence, it is a buried mine Type PMN underneath the mound of 
excavated earth awaiting any disturbing movement or pressure then detonated. 
5.  The accident is caused of breaching SOP. The accident is not an applicable of 
[Demining group] SOP or internal order but the negligence or forgettable mind of the deminer 
himself.  
 
Recommendations 
6.  The investigation team after consideration of all factors makes the following 
recommendations: 
a.  Strictly reinforce control and monitor by section commander and platoon commander 
on demining operations performance drills and coaching basic instruction specifically upon its 
nature. 
b.  All deminers and Section Commanders are to be refreshed training on demining 
operations drill. 
c.  Mobile Platoon Commanders shall be trained on 1st line and middle management. 
d.  Information from this and other accident/incident investigations should be forwarded 
to the appropriate CMAC departments for perusal and discussion.  
 
Signed at:  Battambang  08  August 2002, Investigation Team Leader 
 
 [The ground shown in the photographs is soft and friable with buried, rotting wood – buried 
by the bulldozer.]  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 571 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 3 Hours, 45 minutes 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: None 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Eye 
severe Face 
severe Head 
COMMENT 
See Medical report. 
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Medical Report 
No formal medical report was made available. 
A photograph showed head, left eye and facial injury. 
 
 
Analysis 
The primary case of this accident is listed as “Victim inattention” because it seems that the 
victim was operating in breach of SOPs at the time and carelessly initiated a mine while trying 
to pull a cut branch from a pile of bulldozed earth. The secondary cause is listed as 
“Inadequate equipment” because the victim had to work through a bulldozed berm by hand. It 
seems that the group did not oblige deminers to wear PPE during vegetation removal. 
The incident "Notes" mention an inadequate medical provision. This refers to the fact that it 
took close to four hours for a victim to reach a hospital. 
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